Abstract:
INTRODUCTION
With its institutional motto 'united in diversity', the self-definition of the EU is cosmopolitanist in the sense that it recognizes and builds upon the diversity of cultures within Europe. Within this EU-wide institutional discourse, the diversity that comes with 27 member-states and 23 official languages is conceptualized as richness instead of a barrier for cooperation. The cosmopolitan assumptions are furthermore built into EU governance through mechanisms that ensure the representation of member-states throughout EU institutions. Indeed, the multicultural character of EU institutions has received much scholarly attention 1 , addressing the question of how officials with different nationalities work together in the daily governance of the EU and pointing out to the "transnational" 2 or the "cosmopolitan" 3 identities of EU officials. 2 From its outset, European integration has had a "cosmopolitan momentum" 4 and as it stands today, the EU and its supranational governance can be labeled as a form of "institutionalized cosmopolitism" 5 . The fact that the cosmopolitan ideals are embedded in the conception of the EU, however, is not sufficient to classify it as cosmopolitan. For example, if national categories are not replaced by a cosmopolitan outlook, it could mean that the EU represents an expanded form of nationalism, what can be termed as "Euro-nationalism" 6 .
Thus, "supranationalism bears the risk of degenerating into a European super-nationalism" 7 .
The cosmopolitanism of the EU has indeed been challenged, especially during the discussions on the European Constitution with regard to the defining characteristics and the boundaries of the EU. The relevance and urgency of these existential identity debates is partly linked to the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU 8 . This is mainly due to the fact that it is a contested candidate on grounds of the 'goodness of fit' between its 'European' credentials and the future order of the European project. 'Are there limits to the cultural diversity the EU is able to unite?' has appeared to be a fundamental question that needs to be addressed above and beyond the technical criteria of EU accession. Whereas cosmopolitanism is per definition geared towards a world identity, the fact that there have been renewed calls for drawing the limits of Europe can be considered as contradictory since "as soon as geographical or cognitive borders are established around the concept of cosmopolitanism, the very essentialisms that cosmopolitans as critics have traditionally sought to confront are reproduced." 9 As such, the accession of Turkey constitutes a critical litmus test for the EU's cosmopolitanism. This choice stems from the fact that Turkey is a controversial EU candidate whose accession has been challenged in terms of identity and Turkey's potential inability to act "European" 10 . Whereas the EU's official policy has been to conceive of Turkey's accession bid as a further potential 'foothold' for a cosmopolitan outlook 11 , the concerns about cultural incompatibility have rested on the argument that "Turkey will struggle to assimilate the liberal values of modern(ist) Europe, as these are simply irreconcilable with its primordial Islamic identity" 12 .
We adopt the premise that "cosmopolitanism is a two-way relationship in which encounters with the Other require a mutual acceptance of living with differences and of the possibility of being transformed as a result of this encounter." 13 In this article, we analyze the conceptualizations of cosmopolitan identity within the EU from the perspective of this cosmopolitan premise and question the extent to which this cosmopolitanism extends to include Turkey as a prospective member of the EU. After a summary of the theoretical debate on cosmopolitanism, identity, Turkey, and the EU, we briefly present the empirical data on which we base our analysis. Next, we delve into the conceptualizations of identity within the institutional context of the European Commission. We then move on to the discourses of Commission officials with regard to their perceptions of the Turkish elite based on 3 their encounters with them in the framework of the accession process. On the basis of these findings, we evaluate the extent and limits of cosmopolitanism in the Commission.
COSMOPOLITANISM AND IDENTITY IN THE EU
The engagement of the critical approaches in IR with the issue of Turkish accession goes back to late 1990s when Turkish pleas to be included in the same accession queue with Central and Eastern European countries were rebuffed by European leaders in the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. Iver Neumann had argued that it was Turkey's perception as a 'historical Other' that prevents it from being included as a full member of the European community. 14 Rumelili took the debate further by highlighting how official EU discourse constructs Turkey as a 'liminal' country that can be included only through evaluations on the 'acquired properties' of membership such as democracy and human rights and excluded to the extent that 'inherent properties' such as religion are taken into consideration. 15 Other scholars closer to social constructivism have approached the issue from a Habermesian perspective of argumentative rationality and underlined that the official arguments used to justify Turkish accession in the EU rest only on 'interest based' arguments such as Turkey's strategic value or its economy as opposed to the cultural bases of justification that was used in arguing for the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries in the EU. It was then argued that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been prioritized in the enlargement process at the expense of Turkey because it was not perceived to be a sufficiently European country 16 .
More recently, in analyses that pertain to the European Commission, there has been a tendency to denote the European Commission as a "cosmopolitan agent" in enlargement policy which treats Turkey solely on the basis of acquired criteria such as democracy, human rights or economic governance while upholding a "cosmopolitan identity" that is inclusive of Turkey. 17 While these works have all highlighted the significance of identity based dynamics in the analysis of Turkey-EU relations, their focus of analysis was mainly on the official statements of the EU leaders and/or enlargement Commissioners.
This study focuses on the micro level, namely the individuals working within the European Commission bureaucracy. The Commission is a central actor in the internal institutional structure of the EU and represents the supranational norms of the EU as the institution endowed with the role to represent the overarching European interest. Furthermore, the identities of Commission officials have often been described as "cosmopolitan" 18 . How this cosmopolitan identity is played out and how this self-identity relates to the officials' vision of Europe and Europeanness could be essential in shaping the debates on the future of European integration. In this respect, enlargement policy is crucial in defining the boundaries of the EU by determining which countries to include (in-group)/exclude (out-group) and under which conditions. 4 The Commission is a key EU player which is "engaged in all stages of the enlargement process" 19 . The power of the Commission in the enlargement policy is two-fold. At the macro level, the Commission employs a significant amount of discursive power in both the member states and the applicant countries in question by shaping the terms of enlargement debates via the regular evaluations it provides on the applicant countries. 20 Furthermore, through its official/legal role as negotiator and initiator of policy through recommendations to the Council, it also exercises power by 'governing' where the discursive power becomes institutionalized in a way in which it officially and forcefully conditions, in the words of Foucault 21 , the "possibilities of action" for both the member states and the applicant countries.
Although the enlargement related desks and units of the Commission prepare the main reports and other policy-related documents upon which much of the official discourse rests, there is little information on how the Turkish identity is conceptualized by these European civil servants who do not express their views publicly. By focusing on the discourses of Commission officials on their Turkish counterparts, we limit ourselves to the analysis of a "most At the micro level, the Commission is the only EU institution that engages on a daily basis with the applicant country, both through the country's official/governmental bodies and its civil society institutions. This puts the Commission officials working on the Turkish accession in direct contact with their Turkish counterparts. Socialization theory would lead us to expect that long-lasting and intense contacts induce individuals to take on new ideas and norms. 22 This would lead to a mutual transformation process whereby the Commission elite adjusts its conceptions of Turkey on the basis of new information and contacts and the Turkish elite changes its conceptions of Europe.
One of the key tenets of the cosmopolitan outlook is the recognition of "Otherness", where even a positive value is placed on difference, without hierarchical ordering 23 . Applied to the EU, cosmopolitanism upholds a notion of Europe that rests on "pluralised cultural models" rather than constituting a supranational identity constructed along the lines of the 5 nation-state, or an official identity that is constantly in tension with national identities 24 . Hence one of the central issues that need to be addressed in studying cosmopolitanism empirically is the extent to which cultural categorizations on the basis of nationality are transformed so as to cease thinking in terms of 'us' and 'them'. To the extent that national identity serves to distinguish out-groups from the national 'we' group, culture constitutes a factor of inclusion or exclusion 25 . European identity can equally serve this function when it is used to draw boundaries between EU member-states and its potential members and neighboring countries.
One of the obvious ways of drawing cultural boundaries is the use of stereotypes in evaluating the Other by ascribing characteristics to people on the basis of their group memberships 26 . Stereotyping is especially at play in encounters with the unknown out-group members and stems from the psychological tendency to see out-groups as "all alike" 27 . By Given the limited number of interviews conducted, we do not claim generalizable results. However, the analyses we present and the arguments we bring up in this article have been derived in the framework of the broader research projects of both authors. The interview excerpts which are used in this article should thus be viewed as representations of broader patterns we have observed with regard to the issues in question.
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE COSMOPOLITAN SELF IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Cultural diversity is a daily reality for the bureaucrats of EU institutions as the institutions represent a microcosm of Europe in terms of the diversity of languages, values, attitudes, and cultural backgrounds. As an institution, the European Commission puts the motto of 'unity in diversity' into practice. To begin with, the Commission applies the norm of multinationality throughout its formal structure: National diversity is reflected in the overall distribution of officials and across the organizational hierarchy of the Commission 29 . This means that Commission officials are in daily contact with cultural diversity at work. What is essential, though, is not that officials recognize the presence of the different cultural backgrounds, which can eventually be considered as a demographic given, but how these cultural differences are perceived and acted upon by them. An analysis of cosmopolitanism in the Commission requires us to delve into the meaning of this diversity in practice.
At the individual level, cosmopolitanism refers to an orientation or capacity of individuals that can be described as "being at home with diversity" 30 . In this respect, cosmopolitanism thus refers to "a cultural disposition involving an intellectual an aesthetic stance of 'openness' towards peoples, places and experiences from different cultures, especially those from different 'nations'" 31 . Instead of antagonism towards the 'stranger', cosmopolitanism embraces "the search for, and delight in, the contrasts between societies 7 rather than longing for superiority or for uniformity" 32 . Whereas the discourses of officials embracing the institutional motto of the Commission might be dismissed as paying lip service to the institutional norm, the personal discourses could be more useful in terms of revealing attitudes and in assessing their cosmopolitanism.
To begin with, Commission officials have personal histories and backgrounds that can be termed as cosmopolitan, due to the fact that the majority of them have lived, studied, or worked abroad 33 . Their experience is not limited to having been abroad for an extended period of time, but they have also been extensively exposed to other cultures through mixed families and relationships, which means that they have undergone a multicultural socialization process. Even though officials might not explicitly define themselves as such, their self-definition is one of an enlightened cosmopolitan elite which diverges from the "averagelocal and mono-cultural" national citizen. As they have traveled and picked up pieces from various cultures in the world, these cosmopolitans see themselves no longer representative of their cultures of origin. To the extent that cosmopolitanism signifies "the channeling of specific ideas and cultural forms between cultures" 34 Although Commission officials admit to having had stereotypes about other nationalities when they started working for the Commission, they acknowledge that working with different nationalities has broadened their knowledge on and understanding of different cultures. 8 Commission officials feel that the combination of their backgrounds and experience with cultural diversity at the Commission puts them in a unique position to deal with cultural differences. Working for a multicultural organization develops the ability to feel at home with cultural diversity and to cherish it. As a result, they are able do "enjoy and have fun with the differences" (COM#22). This experience thus changes the perceptions and behavior of Commission officials with regard to culture (both their own and the others).
COM#17:
People are not typical of their nationalities because once you are here, and you meet all the nationalities, and you realize that you are not the center of the world in the end. I think it is typical that everyone, if you stay in your country, that you think you are the best, you are the prettiest. You come to Brussels; you have the chance to meet all these nationalities, to change, to see that each one of them brings in something because everyone has something to bring in. So in the end it is a mix, and I believe that after some time, you are not… Yes, you cannot say that you are typically In explaining her transformation process, this official not only refers to how 'enriching' this 'blending' process has been for her, but gives proof of the fact that she has a more critical view on her own nationality. This excerpt represents a vivid description of the transformation process whereby they learn to take a critical stance towards their own culture and nation and become open to other cultures, which constitutes a key element of cosmopolitanism at the individual level. This intellectual distance from one's own country and the reflexive attitude towards its ways of doing and thinking echoes strongly the cosmopolitan virtue which Bryan Turner has termed as "cosmopolitan irony" 36 
ENLARGING COSMOPOLITANISM IN THE COMMISSION?
By definition, cosmopolitanism is open to enlargement with the addition of new cultures to the existent mix. This disposition has presumably been at work for the previous enlargements.
One might argue, however, that identity issues have not been at the foreground. Even though cultural factors were not a major part of the enlargement debate during the Southern enlargement in 1986 and the Northern enlargement in 1995, the cultural differences between North and South Europeans are frequently referred to in the literature on the EU as a major point of cultural division 37 .
In terms of administrative and historical differences, however, the enlargement towards East European countries has perhaps been the most pronounced EU enlargement in the cultural sense. Even though the largest bulk of new officials belonged to a new generation who have not experienced the communist regime as working adults, before the East European officials arrived in Brussels 38 , officials were wary of the changes this might imply.
As the new officials began to work for the Commission, however, the fears turned out to be unfounded:
COM#13: So, we have people that come from Eastern Europe. And really we, before the enlargement last year, everybody sort of worried. Eastern Europeans, you know, mad communists. These were people coming from what used to be the other side of the Iron Curtain. They'd be completely different. They would change the whole culture. But but, when they came, what did we discover? They are exactly the same! They are white, middle-class, well-educated. You know, I mean seriously it's really quite strange to see them. And they all speak languages which means that they all had a good, if you like, international education in Hungary, Poland, wherever. They're all very very similar to each other.
As this interviewee expresses it vividly, the new officials were far from being 'mad communists'. To the contrary, it appeared that they had similar backgrounds as the incumbent officials, especially in terms of their international education. One of the interviewed Czech officials had obtained a French education starting from secondary school and she also had friends in the Commission from the same school. She also confirmed that the first group of officials from the new member-states was not a 'representative group'.
Whereas one does not usually encounter that many individuals who speak many languages and have had an international education, encountering a Polish official speaking in an accent-free English and French is not a rare occurrence in the Commission 39 . Here again, we see that we are dealing with a cosmopolitan elite.
The case of the Eastern enlargement has indeed added nationalities and languages to the cultural repertoire of the Commission. The expectation that this would result in a cultural change in the institution, however, does not seem to have realized. With the addition 10 of new Eastern cosmopolitans, cosmopolitanism has been extended further but not substantively as the new officials resemble the old officials in terms of their cosmopolitan backgrounds. Even though Commission officials come from four corners of the EU, the diversity is perhaps paradoxically limited. The diversity in terms of backgrounds can be rather characterized as national diversity within the same white middle and upper middle-class European elite.
As it stands today, the EU bureaucracy can barely be qualified as culturally diverse in the broader sense of the word. The EU is in many aspects a typical international organization to the extent that it gives priority to representing national cultures and official languages. The limits of diversity show themselves also in the discrepancy between the diversity present in European societies and at the EU institutions. As Cris Shore also notes, "'cosmopolitan' in the context of the Commission means 'multinational' rather than multiracial.… Most officials are white, Caucasian and middle-class and the representation of ethnic minorities within the EU civil service is not an issue given any weight" 40 . Indeed, in the sample of interviewed officials, there was only one official who belonged to an ethnic minority who shared Shore's point.
As these observations point out, there are limits to the cosmopolitanism of the European Commission. We are speaking of cosmopolitanism at the elite level which also has to do with the nature of European integration as a political project. In the end, the EU started as an elite project, and the EU institutions may be seen as a reflection of these foundations. 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE TURKISH ELITE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Turkey's institutional contacts with the EU has gained pace after the granting of candidacy 
COM-TR#3:
I was in fact surprised by the Turkish administration. I did not expect such capacity and level of activity and knowledge, because when we prepared the screening exercise, the Turkish administration came in Brussels later on to present their legislation, and it was really really really impressive. I was also very surprised, I must say, because in the administration I had to deal with lots of female staff and I was imagining that people would have scarves or something, it was not the case. I never saw a scarf. You know they had lipstick, shoes with heels and so on, they were very modern, I was impressed.
As demonstrated in the first two excerpts above, the Commission elite frequently underscores the 'modern' outlook of the Turkish elite, as displayed in their work-related performance ('well-informed', 'capacity', 'level of activity and knowledge') and/or through their expressions of belief and life-styles. The extent to which impressions gathered are predicated as positive depend upon the congruence of the perceived elite qualities with that of 'Europe' and 'Europeanness'. This is visible in the first excerpt above where contacts, and thus socialization into an assumed set of 'European' behavior is taken as a yardstick for the positive attributes of the interlocutors, through which the new Eastern European memberstates are being subjected to an Othering based on their communist past.
The second excerpt demonstrates that certain given stereotypes, such as the belief that all or a substantial number of women wear the headscarf in a Muslim setting, can change upon contact with the Turkish peers. Yet, instead of indicating a certain degree of cosmopolitan outlook where it is expected that contacts as such would have a transformative impact on the perceptions of the Self in a way in which it becomes more open to recognizing and respecting diversity without subjecting it to hierarchy, it demonstrates a preference for the Other to resemble the Self where the 'headscarf' becomes an aberration from the 'modern' norm. 12 The limits of cultural diversity espoused in the European Commission becomes more visible when the discussions turn to the clear distinctions that the officials draw between their Turkish interlocutors and the rest of the Turkish population: COM-TR#4: If I go to Turkey and I work with the ministries, I have to say, I find they are much more advanced than many other countries I have been dealing with. They are much more European in the sense of education, more modern or whatever… Then you come to the other part and you come to let us say the rest of the population. And there I find that there is a big gap… It needs to transcend this spirit from this part of the population to the rest of the population. There is a value difference, and I think that is about everything. I mean women's rights are definitely one thing, and then also education, also in that sense religion plays a big role, and how that is seen. Especially values like how should religion be separated from state and how should religion be practiced, how big the influence of religion be, with regards to the state and culture in general.
COM-TR#6:
I meet with women, with men at all levels. Gender is very well embedded at the higher level, and it is a very open society, but it is of course the top that we see.
So I have to start thinking or saying that for the time being, it is still very much a dual society. I would not put it rich and poor, but it goes together, educated and uneducated, religious and nonreligious, which I think is now more pronounced than before.
As seen from the excerpts above, Commission officials are often engaged in constructing clear-cut binary distinctions between the elite with which they interact on a professional basis and the 'people' established as a separate category. The use of phrases such as 'dual society' and 'gap' divide the country into the binary oppositions of modern/pre-modern, educated/uneducated, advanced/backward, urban/rural, rich/poor, religious/less religious or nonreligious defined within the framework of European oriented cultural values. 'Gender' and/or 'women's rights' seem to be key issues through which these binaries are constructed.
This entails the perception of Turkish society as a homogenous entity, with little scope for diversity. It points to a single linear historical European narrative 43 and thus excludes accounts that point to the emergence of multiple modernities in Turkey where the clearly delineated categorizations do not necessarily match 44 . The wearing of the headscarf is a typical example in such accounts which emphasize the importance of the headscarf for Muslim women in carving a space for themselves in the public sphere 45 .
More importantly, the predicates displayed above provide insights into the European cultural space that is envisaged by the Commission officials: a modern, progressive, open and enlightened one where religion plays a minimal role. It also suggests that social learning through institutional contacts 46 does not necessarily result in the fostering of a cosmopolitan outlook in the perceptions of a society that is constructed in its mass as 'different' from the 13 modern European Self. In fact, the analysis shows that certain stereotypes have resilience even in the descriptions of the Turkish elite when the discussion concerns attitudes towards national sovereignty among the Turkish officials. This was found to be particularly the case in those DGs that deal with 'politically sensitive' issues requiring a great degree of sovereignty delegation from the nation-state level to the EU: COM-TR#18: People within different ministries that I met are very intelligent, smart and well-educated, so there is no trouble there. But Turks should understand the principles on which the EU is established. The main principle is communication between member states. So for me it is very important that Turkey understands this principle. This, I see, as a bigger problem in Turkey because there is this nationalist feeling that the EU is going to steal their autonomy, that they will lose their sovereignty if they join the EU…The way they communicate is that they do not want to provide a lot of information, they feel that this is for a later stage, that this is some kind of trade off. I find this as a big difference because I come from Central and Eastern Europe and we were more open. We provided a lot of information and we admit our shortcomings. Turks have a tendency to say that we are the best, and sometimes I also had the feeling that you have an agreement, and then in one or two days, you find out that the agreement is not in place. with 'mistrust' towards the EU are presented as significant problems that prevent a constructive dialogue between the two sides. In the first excerpt above, these properties are described as 'national' traits, positioned against those of Eastern Europe, the region from which the interviewee comes from. Hence the positive attributes assigned to their Turkish interlocutors does not preclude the Commission elite from defining their counterparts as 14 comprising culturally determined traits determining the way in which they negotiate with the EU.
COM-TR#8:
A similar situation can be discerned in the second excerpt above, where the 'nationalist' nature of the interlocutors is essentialized and generalized through the construction of a 'way of thinking' that is unique to the Turks and that naturally sets them apart from their European counterparts. By engaging in essentialist stereotyping, such accounts exclude those interpretations which underline that "the problem of reconciling the demands of European integration with national 'pride' … is by no means unique to Turkey" 47 and concerns even present-day member states 48 .
These excerpts also suggest that new information that has been gained through contact with the Turkish interlocutors does not seem to have changed some of the existing stereotypes of officials substantively as they still rely on them to make sense of the behavior of Turkish officials. It has been extensively documented in works of history that the concept of "oriental mentality" had been a dominant stereotype used to describe the Ottoman Empire and the Turks in European narratives, particularly of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 49 .
While it would be misleading to draw linear and reductionist parallels with history, it can be argued that the notion of "ungrounded pride" 50 which constituted a crucial ingredient of this stereotype seems to have survived up to this day in generalizing the attitudes of the Turkish bureaucracy towards the EU.
In short, a closer look at the discourse of the Commission officials on their experiences on the Turkish dossier suggest that faced with substantial diversity, cosmopolitan tendencies may be circumscribed among the Commission bureaucracy. While this may be less pronounced in the conceptualization of the Turkish elite, who can also be subject to stereotyping depending on the subject of discussion, it is more widespread in the perceptions of "the Turkish society", which is constructed by Commission officials as a homogenous entity that is largely predicated as non-European and pre-modern.
CONCLUSION
This article has aimed to assess cosmopolitanism in the EU by analyzing the discourses of Commission officials with regard to their self-identity and the identity of the elites of a controversial EU candidate, Turkey. We started off with a definition of cosmopolitanism as an inclusive world identity which embraces cultural diversity as a richness, such as professed by the EU's institutional motto 'unity in diversity'. As recent research has shown, Commission officials not only define themselves as cosmopolitans, but they also adopt a cosmopolitan lifestyle 51 . Yet this cosmopolitanism is to be mainly characterized as elite-level cosmopolitanism since such lifestyles and characteristics that come with it are barely a widespread phenomenon, neither in Europe nor beyond 52 . This is not problematic as long as 15 the EU remains an elite project. Rising levels of Euroscepticism, however, increasingly make this less attractive politically.
In times of economic and political crisis, the future of the EU becomes a salient topic of debate. The ambitions of the EU as a cosmopolitan project are perhaps the least of EU's concerns. As critics debate the possible end of the EU, there are still countries waiting in line to be included in this European project. The extent to which this project is and will be a cosmopolitan project will depend on the enlargement process further towards the East -from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea. The accession of Turkey is crucial in this respect. That is why we analyzed the discourses of Commission officials in order to assess the extent to which their identities were open towards further cultural diversity. Our results demonstrate that their conceptualization of Turkey is only inclusive of the Turkish elite. This is similar to how Commission officials perceived their East European counterparts before the enlargement took place.
When it comes to a transformation of the perception of the 'Other', that is acquiring the "cosmopolitan imagination" 53 The alternative interpretation would see the evidence provided in this article as a proof for the limits of (current) cosmopolitan Europe. Because Turkey is not accepted as a part of this European identity due to the large cultural differences, it will be difficult if not impossible for Turkey to join the EU. This, however, would strengthen the argument as a sort of "European super-nationalism" 54 , which only includes identities that fit the European identity (however it might be defined at a given point in time and context). Currently, these existential debates seem to be taking place at the member-state level as the popularity of anti-immigrant parties in Europe indicates. The inclusion or exclusion of Turkey will thus be intricately tied to the definition of Europe and Europeans in the near future. This will in turn determine if the EU chooses for a multicultural project composed of diverse cultural traditions
